ABSTRACT: We examine whether proprietary costs affect disclosure quality and how investors react to disclosure quality in a new proprietary cost setting. We apply Verrecchia's (1983) proprietary cost theory to the FIN 48 adoption setting and argue that proprietary costs result from beliefs that the new disclosures could weaken a firm's competitive position when negotiating with tax authorities. FIN 48 is an ideal setting to examine how proprietary costs affect disclosure given the proprietary nature of uncertain tax positions, and the ability to construct objective measures of both proprietary costs and disclosure quality. We construct disclosure quality scores for S&P 1500 firms and offer two empirical findings. First, we find a negative association between proprietary costs and disclosure quality. Second, investors reward firms for low disclosure quality, especially small firms and firms with high proprietary costs. Both findings are consistent with Verrecchia's (1983) theory, and suggest that proprietary costs moderate investor demand for full disclosure.
INTRODUCTION

W e examine firms' initial disclosures under Financial Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes
. Verrecchia (1983) predicts that, in equilibrium, proprietary costs suppress managers' voluntary disclosures because disclosing proprietary information can reduce their firms' competitive position. We apply this theory to the FIN 48 adoption setting and argue that proprietary costs result from market participants' beliefs that the FIN 48 disclosures would provide new information to the tax authorities that would lead to an increase in tax deficiencies. Accordingly, we predict that managers of firms that face higher proprietary costs will disclose less about their uncertain tax positions. 1 Moreover, we also predict that investors will recognize why managers of firms with higher proprietary costs disclose less information, resulting in abnormal stock returns consistent with investors not favoring full disclosure.
FIN 48, effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2006, provides accounting guidance for uncertain tax positions, which arise when taxpayers are uncertain whether the tax authority will assess additional tax payments pursuant to a tax audit. The guidelines standardize the process by which a firm determines the amount of tax benefits it claimed on its tax returns, but that it may not recognize in its financial statements during the time that potential disputes with tax authorities remain unresolved. This amount reflects a liability, termed the unrecognized tax benefit (UTB) that a firm must reveal as part of the FIN 48 disclosure requirements.
Due to the potential to provide new information to the tax authorities, the disclosure requirements of FIN 48 were highly controversial.
2 Although standard-setters maintained that FIN 48 disclosures would not be useful to tax authorities, both firm managers and investors frequently expressed concern that the disclosures could induce an audit, increase the likelihood that the tax authority might uncover an issue, or shift bargaining power toward the taxing authority. Blouin et al. ( , 2010 noted that 89 percent of 4,000 KPMG webcast participants believed FIN 48 disclosures would increase scrutiny by tax authorities. Other constituents noted that the disclosures could provide ''a roadmap for the tax authority that undercuts the firm's bargaining power in the associated tax disputes'' (Spatt 2007) or that firms could ''virtually be holding an arrow, pointing the IRS toward controversial tax benefits it might audit'' (Yoon 2006) . Leuz (2004) notes the difficulty in empirically testing the proprietary cost hypothesis and, as a result, ''there is little empirical evidence on the existence of proprietary costs and their importance in explaining firms' disclosure choices.'' Applying the proprietary cost hypothesis of Verrecchia (1983) to the FIN 48 adoption setting helps overcome two important measurement issues faced in the literature. First, the disclosures are proprietary with respect to tax authorities and increase in the firm's level of tax avoidance, a construct with numerous established proxies in the literature. 3 This overcomes the elusive nature of identifying and measuring competitively sensitive information (Beyer et al. 2010) . Second, the mandatory nature of the disclosures provides a benchmark for measuring disclosure choices-deviations from the explicit requirements of FIN 48 imply withholding of information. 4 This overcomes the need to infer disclosure choices from, for instance, the level of aggregation or fineness of a disclosure (e.g., Piotroski 2002) . Finally, and more generally, we improve the external validity of the proprietary cost hypothesis by offering empirical evidence in a new setting with different types of firms (Shadish et al. 2002) .
To address our research question, we first investigate whether firms that face higher proprietary costs exhibit lower quality FIN 48 adoption disclosures. Adoption disclosures provide the most powerful setting for our study. As described above, perceived proprietary costs ex ante were significant-anecdotally, this perception declined ex post. 5 We measure disclosure quality for calendar year-end S&P 1500 firms using a two-part disclosure score: (1) disclosure compliance, and (2) disclosure clarity. We measure proprietary costs using multiple proxies for tax avoidance from the literature. We examine whether differences in disclosure quality relate to proprietary costs after controlling for other determinants of firms' disclosure choices, and find evidence consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis. Moreover, we also predict and find that the relative significance of proprietary costs may differ across certain components of FIN 48 disclosures-in particular, the proprietary costs of disclosing forward-looking UTB changes are greater than the proprietary costs of disclosing current UTB changes.
Second, we examine how firms' disclosure quality influences investor reaction to FIN 48 adoption disclosures. Verrecchia (1983) suggests that the expected stock price effects of disclosure influence disclosure decisions in the presence of proprietary costs. That is, managerial concerns of revealing proprietary information rationally limit full disclosure despite its apparent benefit because investors no longer treat withheld information as unequivocally less favorable. In the presence of proprietary costs, investors' demand for full disclosure is unclear. To determine how investors view withheld information in our setting, we examine how the market reaction to firms' disclosed UTB amounts varies with disclosure quality. If investors favor full disclosure-i.e., they want firms to provide transparency regarding tax uncertainty-they will reward high-quality FIN 48 disclosures. If investors do not favor full disclosure-i.e., they want firms to avoid scrutiny from taxing authorities-they will penalize high-quality disclosures. Whether investors consider the proprietary costs of disclosure as sufficiently high to forgo the benefits of full disclosure is an empirical question.
We find evidence consistent with investors penalizing firms that make high-quality disclosures, on average. Moreover, our results are concentrated in small firms and firms with higher proprietary costs, consistent with Verrecchia (1983) . Our finding complements a relatively small but growing body of evidence that investors place a positive value on tax avoidance (e.g., Frischmann et al. 2008; Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Koester 2011) . However, our focus on disclosure quality provides new evidence that investors appear willing to accept less disclosure in order to ''facilitate'' firms' tax avoidance activities. This finding is particularly interesting because the motivation for FIN 48 disclosure requirements was to protect investors by forcing firms to provide investors with transparent and comparable disclosures about firms' tax uncertainties.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the second section, we provide motivation and develop hypotheses. The third section describes our data and research design. The fourth section highlights our empirical results and the fifth section concludes.
MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT Background on FIN 48 Disclosures
Paragraphs 20 and 21 of FIN 48 require disclosure of eight items (see the ''Method for Constructing FIN 48 Discloser Scores'' section of Appendix A). Each disclosure potentially may reveal useful information to various taxing authorities (i.e., state, federal, foreign) regarding tax
Hypothesis Development
We motivate our hypotheses from the discretionary disclosure literature because the ambiguous nature of the mandatory FIN 48 disclosure guidelines effectively gives managers discretion over what numbers they report in a disclosure that technically meets the FIN 48 guidelines (see Figure 1 for an illustration of this ambiguity). Moreover, managers may successfully limit their disclosures, With the exception of options 1, 2, 5, and 6, the total UTB amount inferred from the disclosure varies depending on the assumptions made by the user of the financial statements regarding columns 4 and 5. This example considers a firm with unrecognized tax benefits from an uncertain state tax position in the amount of $100 as well as $20 of interest. The state tax benefits, if recognized, will generate a federal tax benefit at 35 percent, while the interest is assumed to be non-deductible (for simplicity). b Disclosure options 13 and 14 illustrate the maximum range of inference about the UTB amount that could result when a user is unsure of the information in both columns 4 and 5. For example, the lower bound of $49 in option 13 assumes ''gross'' and ''yes'' in columns 4 and 5, respectively, while the upper bound of $140 in option 14 assumes "net" and "no" in columns 4 and 5, respectively. even when disclosures are required-particularly in unaudited interim financial reports that are subject to less stringent attestation standards. 8 Grossman and Hart (1980) and Milgrom (1981) provide the theoretical framework for discretionary disclosure. These studies conclude that full disclosure arises if (1) disclosure is costless; (2) investors know that the firm has private information; (3) the firm can credibly disclose its private information to investors; (4) investors respond to the firm's disclosure decision in the same way; and (5) the firm knows how investors will respond to disclosure of its private information.
The primary cost of disclosure cited in the literature arises when a disclosure provides proprietary information to external parties (Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1986; Wagenhofer 1990; Darrough and Stoughton 1990; Feltham and Xie 1992) . Little empirical research exists, however, on the effects of proprietary costs on disclosure, except in the area of segment reporting (Hayes and Lundholm 1996; Leuz 2004; Hann 2003, 2007; Botosan and Stanford 2005) . Beyer et al. (2010) state that measuring and quantifying proprietary costs remains a major challenge, which contributes to the lack of empirical research as well as the difficulty of finding settings where researchers can observe managers withholding proprietary information.
FIN 48 is an ideal setting to examine how proprietary costs influence firms' disclosure choices given the proprietary nature of information about tax uncertainty, the availability of measures of tax avoidance (providing measures of proprietary costs), and sufficiently ambiguous mandated disclosure guidelines adopted in unaudited financial reports (providing measures of firms' disclosure choices). Consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis in Verrecchia (1983) , we predict a negative association between proprietary costs and FIN 48 disclosure quality (stated in the null):
H1: Firms' proprietary costs are not negatively associated with their initial FIN 48 disclosure quality.
We are also interested in how proprietary costs affect the quality of a specific component of the FIN 48 disclosure, the look-forward disclosure (FIN 48 }21d). Various constituencies expressed significant concerns during the FASB's deliberations about the requirement to provide a forwardlooking disclosure. Respondents argued that this disclosure could alert the taxing authority to a UTB amount that is specific to a particular issue within a taxing jurisdiction. Consistent with this concern, less than 40 percent of firms in our sample provide this disclosure (see, also, Katz 2008; Seigel and Associates 2008; Dunbar et al. 2010) . Because firms initially perceived that the lookforward disclosure would reveal proprietary information to the taxing authority, we predict a negative association between proprietary costs and FIN 48 look-forward disclosure quality (stated in the null):
H2: Firms' proprietary costs are not negatively associated with their initial FIN 48 lookforward disclosure quality.
Finally, we examine how firms' disclosure quality influences investor reaction to initial FIN 48 disclosures. Verrecchia (1983) suggests that the expected stock price effects of disclosure influence disclosure decisions in the presence of proprietary costs. That is, managerial concerns of revealing proprietary information rationally limit full disclosure despite its apparent benefit because investors no longer treat withheld information as unequivocally less favorable. In the presence of proprietary costs, demand for full disclosure by investors is unclear.
To determine how investors view withheld information in our setting, we examine how the market reaction to firms' disclosed UTB amounts varies with disclosure quality. If investors favor full disclosure-i.e., they want firms to provide transparency regarding tax uncertainty-they will reward high-quality FIN 48 disclosures. If investors do not favor full disclosure-i.e., they want firms to avoid scrutiny from taxing authorities-they will penalize high-quality disclosures. Whether investors consider the proprietary costs of disclosure as sufficiently high to forgo the benefits of full disclosure is an empirical question. This leads to our final hypothesis (stated in the null):
H3: Investor reaction to initial disclosures of firms' UTB amounts does not vary with firms'
FIN 48 disclosure quality.
DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN Disclosure Scores
We examine FIN 48 footnote disclosures of 1,048 calendar year-end firms in the S&P 1500 index as of January 1, 2007, excluding 128 firms that disclose a 0 or non-material UTB amount, 42 real estate investment trusts, and 7 non-timely filers. We construct a two-part disclosure quality score for each firm in our sample. COMPLETE ranges from 0 to 8 and measures compliance with the FIN 48 disclosure guidelines by capturing the presence or absence of each required disclosure described in the ''Background on FIN 48 Disclosures'' section. CLARITY ranges from 0 to 4 and measures the precision of the required disclosures by capturing the presence or absence of important clarifying information needed to understand and interpret the disclosure. Each firm has a disclosure score, TOTAL, equal to COMPLETE plus CLARITY. We define each of the 12 disclosure score components in Table 1 , Panel B and provide detailed information on our disclosure scores in Appendix A. Our relatively large sample of calendar year-end S&P 1500 firms allows us to provide some perspective on the disclosure quality of firms of various sizes (statistics not tabulated); e.g., the S&P 500, 400, and 600 indices represent large-, mid-, and small-cap firms, respectively. On average, COMPLETE is higher for S&P 500 firms relative to other firms (7.03 . 6.68, t ¼ 5.19) but lower for S&P 600 firms relative to other firms (6.55 , 6.96, t ¼ 4.80) . However, CLARITY is lower for S&P 500 firms relative to other firms (1.27 , 1.53, t ¼ 4.18) but higher for S&P 600 firms relative to other firms (1.56 . 1.36, t ¼ 3.29). If it is difficult to regulate and enforce clarity relative to completeness, then large firms may be more ''compliant'' but reduce the information content of required disclosures through ambiguous language. UTBMV, ETRMV, Q1INTPEN, and OPEN are larger for S&P 500 firms relative to other firms (0.0145 . 0.0092, t ¼ 5. 09; 0.0093 . 0.0064, t ¼ 3.66; 0.0024 . 0.0014, t ¼ 4.41; and 5.37 . 4.63, t ¼ 3.42, respectively) . On average, S&P 400 firms expect the largest UTB decrease (j-0.0026j . j-0.0011j, t ¼ 2.56) and S&P 600 firms had the largest READJ (j-0.0011j . j-0.0005j, t ¼ 2.07).
Firm and Investor Responses to Uncertain Tax Benefit Disclosure Requirements
Research Design
Tests of H1 and H2
To test H1, we estimate Equation (1) using an ordered logit regression as follows:
When estimating Equation (1), we define the dependent variable, SCORE, as either COMPLETE, CLARITY, or TOTAL. Proprietary costs of disclosing information about uncertain tax positions arise from the possibility that the disclosure may increase the probability of an audit occurring or increase the effectiveness of a current audit. Consistent with H1, we expect a negative association between SCORE and TAXAVD, our proxy for proprietary costs. We consider multiple measures of the extent to which firms engage in tax avoidance (TAXAVD). CASHETR is a three-year average cash effective tax rate, measured as the sum of cash taxes paid from 2004 to 2006 divided by the sum of total pretax income from 2004 to 2006 (Dyreng et al. 2008) . BOOKETR is a three-year average book effective tax rate, measured as the sum of total income tax expense from 2004 to 2006 divided by the sum of total pretax income from 2004 to 2006. BTD is the difference between book income and estimated taxable income, measured as pretax income minus the sum of grossed up (by 0.35) current federal and foreign tax expense less the change in the NOL carryforward. DD_BTD is a measure of abnormal tax accruals, calculated as the residual from a regression of book-tax differences on total accruals (Desai and Dharmapala Francis et al. (1994) we define highly litigated industries as 2833-2836, 8731-8734, 7371-7379, 3570-3577 , and 3600-3674. REGDUM þ An indicator variable set to 1 if a firm is in a highly regulated industry and 0 otherwise. Consistent with Warfield et al. (1995) we define highly regulated industries as SIC codes 4812-4813, 4833, 4841, 4811-4899, 4922-4924, 4931, 4941, 6021-6023, 6035-6036, 6141, 6311, 6321 , and 6331. 2006). DTAX is a measure of abnormal permanent differences (Frank et al. 2009 ). CUSHION is the tax cushion, measured as current tax expense less cash taxes paid less the change in income taxes payable (Blouin and Tuna 2007) . Finally, LOBBY is total firm spending on tax-related lobbying.
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These measures capture different aspects of the nature and extent of firm's tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) and they measure actual tax reporting with error (see De Simone et al. 2011) . Therefore, we aggregate these proxies using principal components analysis, which results in one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.5. CASHETR, BOOKETR, BTD, and CUSHION have the largest factor loadings in the principal components analysis. A higher value of TAXAVD implies that a firm engages in more extensive tax avoidance behavior and, thus, faces higher proprietary costs from full disclosure in our FIN 48 setting.
To test H2, we estimate Equation (1) using an ordered logit regression with D_FWD as the dependent variable. D_FWD is a component of COMPLETE and ranges from 0 to 1 depending on whether the firm makes a forward-looking disclosure regarding the item, nature, and amount of the expected change in the UTB over the next 12 months. Disclosure of expected changes to the UTB is a controversial component of the required FIN 48 disclosures in terms of providing a roadmap to the taxing authority for all firms. Consistent with H2, we expect a negative association between TAXAVD, our proxy for proprietary costs, and D_FWD. Equation (1) includes a number of control variables that capture firm-specific costs and benefits that may affect firms' disclosure choices. FIN 48 potentially entails significant implementation costs arising from the need to analyze, document, and support the firm's tax positions using a new recognition and measurement process. Because COMPLETE and CLARITY measure different aspects of the FIN 48 disclosure (CLARITY measures lack of precision while COMPLETE measures lack of compliance), we include CPCL_DS to control for a firm's propensity toward full disclosure. When the dependent variable SCORE equals COMPLETE (CLARITY), CPCL_DS equals CLARITY (COMPLETE). When the dependent SCORE equals TOTAL, we drop CPCL_DS from Equation (1).
10 To control for cross-sectional variation in implementation costs, we include WEAKYEARS, TAXFEES, DAYS, BUS_SEG, and GEO_SEG. Firms reporting a control weakness in their tax accounts (WEAKYEARS) may have greater difficulty analyzing and substantiating their tax positions. Firms that pay higher tax fees to their auditors (TAXFEES) tend to be more sufficiently reserved for uncertain tax positions (Gleason and Mills 2011) . If auditor-provided tax services places more rigor on the tax accrual process, this may reduce the cost of preparing information necessary to comply with FIN 48. Anecdotally, the adoption of FIN 48 imposed significant demands on firm and auditor resources. Thus, we include the number of days between the quarterend and the quarterly filing date (DAYS) as a proxy for implementation costs. We also include BUS_SEG and GEO_SEG to control for the complexity of the firms underlying business (Li 2008 (Li , 2010 . Managers of firms with complex operations are more likely to engage in complex tax positions that they must analyze pursuant to FIN 48 adoption, increasing the burden of applying the two-step process of FIN 48 to each tax position.
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Prior research investigating the effects of litigation risk on management disclosure practices finds that the threat of shareholder litigation can have opposing effects on managers' disclosure decisions (Skinner 1994; Francis et al. 1994; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Soffer et al. 2000) . The potential for legal action related to inadequate or untimely disclosures can improve disclosure. However, litigation risk can potentially reduce incentives to provide disclosure in cases where a significant amount of judgment is inherent in making the disclosure. Prior work generally includes an indicator variable for firms in high-litigation industries (LITDUM). However, Billings (2008) suggests that researchers can also measure litigation risk by prior incidence of litigation (SUESCALE). As the net effect of litigation risk on disclosure is ambiguous, we do not make a prediction on either LITDUM or SUESCALE.
Consistent with existing literature suggesting that firm monitoring affects disclosure quality, we include measures that capture various aspects of corporate governance (Warfield et al. 1995) . Due to the high proprietary costs of disclosure in our setting, it is unclear whether a high-quality FIN 48 disclosure is in the shareholders' best interest. Therefore, we do not make predictions on our measures of internal governance, the percentage of insiders on the board (BODINSIDE), the number of additional boards current directors serve on (BODOTHER), and the number of board interlocks (BODLOCKS). However, we expect a positive coefficient on our external governance measures, BIG4 and REGDUM, because auditors or regulators, unlike boards, do not hold fiduciary responsibilities to firms' shareholders. We expect a higher-quality disclosure in instances when the firm uses a Big 4 audit firm (BIG4) and/or operates in a highly regulated industry (REGDUM), and is thus subject to additional monitoring by regulators. 12 Studies have shown that information asymmetry and the demand for information should increase firms' incentives to make high-quality disclosures (e.g., Bhushan 1989; Lang and Lundholm 1993) . A positive association between analyst forecasting activity, Q1NUMEST, and the level of financial disclosure would be consistent with the existing literature. Multinational firms likely face greater information asymmetry than firms that generate most of their business domestically. In our setting specifically, the demand for tax information should be higher the greater the extent of foreign operations (FOROPS) because multinational firms face more tax planning opportunities and face tax uncertainty in a number of different tax jurisdictions. However, managers of firms with more extensive foreign operations likely have concerns about the foreign governments' use (or misuse) of FIN 48 information and thus, may be less forthcoming.
Finally, to control for the possibility that FIN 48 disclosure quality is correlated with disclosure quality more generally, we include in Equation (1) firm characteristics that predict comprehensive disclosure, size (Q1SIZE), profitability (Q1PFT), capital intensity (Q1CAPINT), leverage (Q1LTDA), and investment opportunities (Q1MB). Prior research generally finds a positive association between firm size and disclosure quality (Lang and Lundholm 1993) . However, large firms also face increased visibility, which raises the possibility of less disclosure to reduce potential political costs. Additionally, large firms are in a better position to ''hide'' information contained in any single disclosure due to the sheer volume of financial disclosures that they make. Capital intensity is a proxy for entry barriers and disclosure quality is likely to increase as the threat of entry decreases (Cohen 2003) . Agency problems associated with debt increase with leverage. However, there may be an inverse relationship between higher leverage, which implies less equity, and cost savings in private information acquisition. Prior research (Skinner 1994; Lang and Lundholm 1993) finds mixed results concerning the effect of performance on disclosure and we do not make a prediction for our measure of profitability. Investors commonly use the market-to-book ratio to measure the investment opportunity set, and the associated financing considerations. The market-to-book ratio also proxies for the information asymmetry between management and investors, an important determinant of the disclosure choice (Verrecchia 1990 ).
Many of our control variables also control for the complexity of different aspects of a firm's environment so TAXAVD should not primarily reflect the effect of ''complexity'' on the firm's ability to offer a high-quality disclosure. For example, debt-to-assets (Q1LTDA) measures capital structure complexity; size (Q1SIZE), capital intensity (Q1CAPINT), and (FOROPS) could capture complexities in a firm's operating structure; and analyst following (Q1NUMEST) and the number of internal control weaknesses (WEAKYEARS) could capture complexities associated with the firm's internal information environment, which managers need to substantiate a firm's tax positions.
Tests of H3
To test H3, we examine how the market reaction to firms' disclosed UTB amounts varies with disclosure quality. Specifically, we estimate Equation (2) using ordinary least squares (we cluster 12 We also run separate specifications of Equation (1) that drop the industry-based indicators LITDUM and REGDUM and include industry fixed-effects (using the Fama-French 17-industry classification scheme). Our inferences are qualitatively similar to the inferences we make based on the regressions we report in Table 3. the standard errors by the filing date of Form 10-Q):
where CAR is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i over a five-day window (À2, 0, þ2); day 0 is the filing date of Form 10-Q with the SEC. We calculate CAR using a market model estimated from 170 to 21 days prior to the filing date and using the parameter estimates to compute risk-adjusted abnormal returns. We require a minimum of 36 daily return observations prior to the filing date to calculate the market model. UTBMV is the total UTB reported at the end of the first quarter of 2007, scaled by MVE at the end of 2006. 13 We denote DQ as an indicator variable equal to 1 when either COMPLETE, CLARITY, or TOTAL falls above the sample median, 0 otherwise.
14 UTBMV Ã DQ, the interaction between UTBMV and DQ, is the focus of our test of H3. If investors favor full disclosure-i.e., they want firms to provide transparency regarding tax uncertainty-then we expect a positive coefficient on a 3 . If investors do not favor full disclosure-i.e., they want firms to avoid scrutiny from taxing authorities-then we expect a negative coefficient on a 3 . Whether investors consider the proprietary costs of disclosure as sufficiently high to forgo the benefits of full disclosure is an empirical question.
UE is the earnings forecast error, computed as the reported EPS less the mean I/B/E/S analyst forecast for the first quarter of 2007 (scaled by beginning of quarter price per share); we include UE to account for the security price consequences of unexpected earnings. Q1SIZE is the log of total assets at the end of the first quarter of 2007 and RET100 is the cumulative raw return for the 100 days prior to the beginning of the 10-Q disclosure announcement period. We include RET100 in order to control for error in our measure of UTBMV and unexpected earnings (Brown et al. 1987; Collins et al. 1994; Lys and Sivaramakrishnan 1988; Kumar and Visvanathan 2003) .
15 By including RET100, we hope to mitigate any potential measurement error-related coefficient bias.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
We provide aggregate descriptive statistics for the independent variables we use to test our hypotheses in Table 2 , Panel B. However, our large sample of calendar year-end S&P 1500 firms allows us to discuss how these characteristics vary by firm size (size-based descriptives are untabulated). S&P 500 firms have the lowest mean book effective tax rate (BOOKETR), the highest mean book-tax difference (BTD), and the highest mean abnormal permanent tax differences (DTAX), consistent with large firms engaging in higher levels of tax avoidance. S&P 500 firms are also the most profitable (Q1PFT), have the largest market-to-book ratios (Q1MB), are subject to more litigation (SUESCALE), have the largest analyst following (Q1NUMEST), pay a larger percentage of tax fees to their audit firm (TAXFEES), and have the largest percentage of foreign operations (FOROPS). 13 We obtain similar results if we scale UTBMV by contemporaneous MVE. 14 We estimate separate versions of Equation (2) in order to examine the moderating effect of each disclosure score (COMPLETE, CLARITY, or TOTAL). 15 We also calculate RET100 over alternative windows, i.e., 120 days and 80 days prior to the start of the event window. All results reported in Tables 4 and 5 are quantitatively similar using these alternative measures. 16 We also include a number of additional control variables in our return regressions, including Q1MB, Q1LTDA, Q1CAPINT, and Q1PFT, lagged TAXAVD, WEAKYEARS, and TAXFEES. All of the results reported in Tables 4  and 5 are quantitatively similar when we include these additional variables in the regressions. Firms in the S&P 400 are more capital intensive (Q1CAPINT), have the largest amount of debt in their capital structures (Q1LTDA), and have the most firms in regulated industries (REGDUM). S&P 600 firms have the largest 10-Q filing period (DAYS) and the highest frequency of internal control weaknesses (WEAKYEARS). Pearson correlations (untabulated) for all variables in our regression equations suggest that our large set of independent variables does not exhibit multicollinearity. The highest correlation is between the extent of foreign operations (FOROPS) and our measure of tax avoidance (TAXAVD) (q ¼ 0.446).
Firm Response-Determinants of Disclosure Quality
In Table 3 , we present the results of estimating Equation (1) for 643 firms with available data for the model variables, using COMPLETE, CLARITY, and TOTAL as the dependent variable in Columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. We present fully standardized coefficients Table 6 ); CLARITY ¼ The sum of four discretionary disclosure score components (see Appendix A, Table 7 Firm and Investor Responses to Uncertain Tax Benefit Disclosure Requirementsfirst, followed by standard errors clustered by industry (using the Fama-French 17-industry scheme).
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Consistent with H1, we find a negative association between our measure of proprietary costs, TAXAVD, and FIN 48 disclosure quality, regardless of whether we define SCORE as COMPLETE, CLARITY, or TOTAL. A one standard deviation increase in TAXAVD reduces COMPLETE, CLARITY, and TOTAL by 0.058, 0.072, and 0.070 standard deviations, respectively. The observed (latent) standard deviation of COMPLETE, CLARITY, and TOTAL is 1.05 (1.86), 0.90 (1.87), and 1.43 (1.84); therefore, in economic terms, a one unit increase in TAXAVD reduces COMPLETE by 0.8 to 1.4 percent, CLARITY by 1.6 to 3.3 percent, and TOTAL by 0.9 to 1.1 percent.
The results in Column (1) of Table 3 show a significantly positive association among COMPLETE and CPCL_DS (CLARITY), firm size (Q1SIZE), the number of additional boards served on by board members (BODOTHER), high-litigation industry membership (LITDUM), and the extent of foreign operations (FOROPS). We find a significant, negative association between COMPLETE and profit margin (Q1PFT). On average, Q1SIZE, Q1PFT, and FOROPS are the strongest determinants of COMPLETE. The results in Column (2) of Table 3 show a significantly positive association among CLARITY and CPCL_DS (COMPLETE), leverage (Q1LTDA), REGDUM, and tax fees paid to auditors (TAXFEES), and a significant, negative association among CLARITY and Q1SIZE and FOROPS. On average, Q1SIZE, Q1LTDA, and FOROPS are the strongest determinants of CLARITY. We attribute the different sign on Q1SIZE and FOROPS in Columns (1) and (2) to the possibility that large firms and firms with more extensive foreign operations face greater scrutiny from the SEC. Thus, managers of large and multinational firms reduce their firms' disclosure quality by reducing the clarity of the disclosure, while technically complying with the FIN 48 guidelines. Finally, in Column (3), we report a significant, negative association among TOTAL and the market-to-book ratio (Q1MB), analyst following (Q1NUMEST), and the number of business segments (BUS_SEG), and a significant, positive association among TOTAL and REGDUM, and the amount of tax fees paid to auditors (TAXFEES). On average, TAXAVD, Q1NUMEST, and TAXFEES are the strongest determinants of TOTAL.
We report the results of estimating Equation (1) after we define the dependent variable as D_FWD, a component of COMPLETE, in Column (4) of Table 3 . Again, we report fully TABLE 3 (continued) *, **, *** Denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed) levels, respectively. a This table presents the results of ordered logit regressions (fully standardized coefficient estimates in the first row followed by standard errors in parentheses in the second row) that evaluate the effect of firm-specific characteristics on disclosure quality. We cluster standard errors by industry (using the Fama-French 17-industry classification scheme) and the 10-Q filing date in each regression. We define the dependent variables as follows: COMPLETE ¼ The sum of eight required disclosure score components (see Appendix A, Table 6 ); CLARITY ¼ The sum of four discretionary disclosure score components (see Appendix A, (1), (2), (4), and (5), we define it as follows:
Column (1): CPCL_DS ¼ CLARITY; Column (2): CPCL_DS ¼ COMPLETE; Columns (4) and (5): CPCL_DS ¼ CLARITY.
standardized coefficients followed by standard errors clustered by industry. Consistent with H2, we report a negative association between our measure of proprietary costs, TAXAVD, and FIN 48 lookforward disclosure quality in Column (4). In Column (5), we replace D_FWD with D_CHG as the dependent variable in Equation (1) to contrast the relative proprietary costs associated with these two similar disclosure components. 18 D_CHG provides information about past changes in the UTB, while D_FWD provides information about future changes in the UTB. We find a negative but insignificant association between TAXAVD and D_CHG. This is evidence that the firm-specific proprietary costs of disclosure varies across certain disclosure components, perhaps depending on each firm's unique tax situation.
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Investor Response-Consequences of Disclosure Quality
We report the results of estimating Equation (2) for 829 firms with available data for the model variables in Panel A of Table 4 . 20 We focus on the interaction effect between the UTB and disclosure quality; therefore, investor expectations of the disclosed UTB do not cloud how we interpret our result. 21 Our view is that revised expectations of firms' future cash flows associated with uncertain tax positions varied with the amount of information provided in the new disclosure. By failing to comply with the disclosure requirements of FIN 48 and/or ensuring that the disclosed information lacked specificity, ''low-quality'' firms reduce the proprietary cost of the disclosure by making it less informative to the taxing authority. Consequently, investors revise their beliefs downward regarding the costs that FIN 48 would impose on these firms.
In Columns (1), (4), and (7) of Panel A, we define the independent variable DQ in the regression as an indicator variable that equals 1 when COMPLETE, CLARITY, or TOTAL, respectively, is above the sample median, 0 otherwise. When DQ is below the sample median, we observe a significant, positive association between abnormal returns and UTBMV. A one standard deviation change in UTBMV increases the abnormal return in the five-day window around the 10-Q filing date by 46, 63, and 72 basis points when we define DQ as COMPLETE, CLARITY, and TOTAL, respectively.
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The interaction of UTBMV and DQ represents the incremental association between abnormal returns and UTBMV when DQ is above the sample median. We obtain negative coefficients on the interaction term in all three columns; however, the coefficient on UTBMV Ã DQ is significant only when we define DQ as CLARITY or TOTAL. Furthermore, the total coefficient on UTBMV when DQ is above the sample median (i.e., the sum of a 1 þ a 3 ) is not significantly different from zero. 18 The requirement to disclose, D_CHG, applies only to firms that have actual UTB changes during the quarter, thus the sample we used to estimate the D_CHG Equation (n ¼ 163) is smaller than that used to estimate the D_FWD Equation (n ¼ 643). When we estimate the D_FWD Equation using the sample from the D_CHG Equation, the coefficient on D_FWD increases from À0.074 to À0.112 and remains significant. 19 For robustness, we also define the dependent variable COMPLETE as the sum of D_FWD, D_ETR, and D_INTPEN (the three components of COMPLETE that likely have the highest proprietary costs of disclosure) and find results consistent with H1 and H3. We also use each component of our TOTAL disclosure score as a dependent variable in Equation (1) and document a negative and significant association between TAXAVD and each of the following disclosure score components: interest and penalties (D_INTPEN), future UTB changes (D_FWD), the adoption adjustment (D_READJ), the part of the UTB that does not affect the ETR (D_NONETR), whether the UTB is reported gross or net of any tax benefits (D_GROSS), and whether the UTB includes interest and penalties (D_INCL). 20 Our inferences do not change if we limit the sample to the 643 firms we used to estimate Equation (1). 21 In an efficient market, it is reasonable to expect that investors formed sensible expectations regarding expected future cash outflows associated with uncertain tax positions. It is less likely that investors formed expectations regarding the contemporaneous disclosure quality given that FIN 48 was a new standard and the optimal threshold level of disclosure was unknown. Therefore, in our setting, the revised beliefs about the cost that FIN 48 imposes on firms reflected in the market reaction predominately arises from unexpected disclosure quality. 22 The standard deviation of UTBMV is 0.018 (a 1 ¼ 0.2558, std UTBMV ¼ 0.018: 0.2558 Ã 0.018 ¼ 0.0046). We define the variables in Table 1 .
Firm and Investor Responses to Uncertain Tax Benefit Disclosure Requirements
Therefore, firms with high FIN 48 disclosure quality experience no significant market reaction to the disclosed UTB amount, while firms with low FIN 48 disclosure quality experience a significantly positive market reaction to the disclosed UTB amount. Verrecchia (1983) predicts that investors will not punish (or will punish less) a firm for withholding information in the presence of proprietary costs. The results we report in Table 4 are consistent with this prediction and the presence of proprietary costs in the FIN 48 setting.
To provide further evidence that the results of our market reaction tests arise from proprietary costs, we partition our sample based on TAXAVD, our measure of proprietary costs. We create an indicator variable that equals 1 when lagged TAXAVD falls in the upper quartile of its distribution, 0 otherwise. If investors consider the proprietary costs of disclosure as sufficiently high to forgo the benefits of full disclosure, we anticipate that our results of H3 should be concentrated in the sample of firms for which TAXAVD ¼ 1.
The results we report in Columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8), and (9) of Panel A in Table 4 largely correspond to this prediction. The coefficient on UTBMV Ã DQ for TAXAVD ¼ 1 firms is significantly smaller than the coefficient on UTBMV Ã DQ for TAXAVD ¼ 0 firms when DQ equals CLARITY and TOTAL (the difference in interaction terms is insignificant when DQ equals COMPLETE). Overall, our findings suggest that when investors evaluate FIN 48 disclosures, they are primarily concerned with the proprietary cost of providing a roadmap to the taxing authority rather than full disclosure.
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Exploratory Analyses
We expand upon our main investor reaction analysis in two ways. First, we allow the coefficient on UTBMV in Equation (2) to vary across two components of the UTB (discussed below). Second, we compare our main results across large versus small firms. Both analyses introduce potential additional variation in proprietary costs associated with the UTB disclosure.
UTB Components
FIN 48 requires that the firm separately state the portion of the UTB that, if recognized, would affect the ETR and, thus, earnings (ETRMV). Here, we clarify the types of tax positions that ETRMV does and does not capture (i.e., OTHMV). ETRMV does not capture UTB reversals that would affect another balance sheet account such as deferred tax assets/liabilities, goodwill, or accumulated other comprehensive income. This includes tax positions that create temporary booktax differences, tax positions that create no book-tax differences, the excess of the gross versus the net effect of state and foreign tax positions (including nexus issues) and foreign transfer pricing issues, any uncertain tax benefits acquired, and uncertain tax positions recorded in foreign subsidiaries for which the firm records a currency translation adjustment. ETRMV also does not include any UTB reversals that would flow through income from discontinued operations.
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ETRMV does capture uncertain tax positions that create permanent book-tax differences, the net 23 Prior studies find that investors value tax avoidance among well-governed firms but that tax avoidance among poorly governed firms could exacerbate concerns of managerial diversion (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Koester 2011) . In untabulated analysis, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term (UTBMV Ã DQ) is only significantly negative for well-governed firms, suggesting that poor disclosure quality heightens concerns of managerial diversion in poorly governed firms. 24 In our example from Figure 1 , referring only to the tax, the firm should disclose a gross UTB (UTBMV) of $100 but an amount that affects the ETR (ETRMV) of only $65. Thus, the amount that does not affect the ETR (OTHMV) would be $35 ($100 À $65). Thus, OTHMV includes the portion of the UTB arising state and foreign tax planning that the firm expects to offset with a benefit in another taxing jurisdiction. However, as not all firms follow this disclosure practice, there is likely to be measurement error in studies that parse out ETRMV from OTHMV.
effect of state tax positions (including nexus issues), and possibly the net effect of foreign transfer pricing issues.
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We motivate our exploratory analysis of the UTB using Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) , who note that others have conjectured that tax positions that reduce accounting earnings (i.e., permanent differences) may be more aggressive than those that do not (i.e., temporary differences), although the authors also note that there is no evidence on this issue. 26 If uncertain tax positions that affect accounting earnings are relatively more aggressive, then these tax positions may have a higher proprietary cost of disclosure.
To explore whether the effect of disclosure quality on the market reaction to the UTB varies across these two UTB components, we estimate an expanded version of Equation (2) as follows:
We report the results of estimating Equation (3) in Columns (1), (4), and (7) of Panel B in Table 4 . Overall, these results show a positive market reaction to a low-quality disclosure of both UTB components, and no reaction to a high-quality disclosure of both components (i.e.,
. All uncertain tax positions affect expected future cash flows; therefore, it is not surprising that investors react similarly across the two components. We caveat our results however, by pointing out that knowing the portion of the UTB that affects the ETR requires high-quality disclosure. Thus, we are hesitant to draw strong conclusions from our UTB decomposition.
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Firm Size
We also separately examine small-cap (S&P 600) and large-cap (S&P 500) firms.
28 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) examination statistics of tax year 2007 returns reveal that 75 percent of the large firms in our sample can expect to be audited 63 percent of the time, while nearly half of these firms can expect to be audited 100 percent of the time. In contrast, more than half of the small firms in our sample should expect to be audited only 19 percent of the time. 29 These statistics reflect that resource-constrained taxing authorities will, all else equal, strive for greater coverage of larger firms. Consequently, the presumption that the taxing authority will examine all tax positions in the recognition and measurement process of FIN 48 introduces a greater proprietary cost of FIN 48 disclosure for small firms. 30 25 If the firm has an APB No. 23 assertion in place, then uncertain tax benefits associated with transfer pricing issues would not be included at all in ETRMV; rather, all of the uncertainty would be part of OTHMV. This is because any reversal of the UTB would affect a deferred tax liability. 26 In fact, descriptive evidence highlighted by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) suggests the opposite. Further, Wilson (2009) and Lisowsky et al. (2013) document that many aggressive tax shelters create temporary differences. 27 For instance, when a firm is silent on the portion of the UTB that affects the ETR (which is noncompliant in our view), assuming the entire amount of the UTB affects the ETR increases the coefficient on ETRMV by 500 percent. Additionally, the portion of the UTB that will affect earnings (ETRMV) sometimes includes interest and penalties, while the disclosed UTB does not. Thus, if one computes OTHMV by subtracting ETRMV from UTBMV, one will often understate OTHMV and overstate ETRMV. Any study that attempts to decompose the UTB into these two components suffers from the disclosure quality issues that we describe in our study. 28 Frischmann et al. (2008) and Koester (2011) examine the market reaction disclosures of firms in the S&P 500. 29 http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/07databkrevised.pdf 30 The recognition and measurement process requires that firms assume that the probability that the tax authority will audit the uncertain tax position is 100 percent. Since the audit probability of smaller firms is much lower than that of larger firms, FIN 48 disclosure requirements may impose greater costs on smaller firms by attracting a tax audit that it might have otherwise avoided. To examine this potential size-based variation in proprietary costs, we investigate whether the market reaction to FIN 48 disclosure quality varies by firm size. In Panel A of Table 5 , we present the results of estimating Equation (2) separately for large and small firms, which correspond to the S&P 500 and S&P 600, in Columns (1) and (2), respectively. This additional analysis suggests that our primary results in Panel A of Table 4 appear to be concentrated in small firms. Specifically, the results in Panel A of Table 5 show a positive and significant association between UTBMV and returns when disclosure quality is low for both large and small firms, but the incremental association between returns and UTBMV when disclosure quality is high is significant only for small firms. Documenting that the results for the full sample from Panel A of Table 4 are concentrated in small firms further reinforces the link between proprietary costs and disclosure.
In Panel B of Table 5 , we re-examine our UTB decomposition analysis by estimating Equation (3) separately across large and small firms. These tests reveal similar inferences as those we report in Panel A of Table 5 , namely that disclosure quality affects the market reaction to the UTB for small firms, but not large firms. Furthermore, we observe a ''reward'' for low-quality disclosure in small firms with respect to both UTB components, consistent with the fact that both components affect expectations of future firm cash flows, regardless of the UTB's settlement effect on earnings.
In Column (1) of Panel B in Table 5 , we observe that disclosure quality does not influence the market reaction to the UTB disclosure of large firms (i.e., the interaction terms are insignificant). However, we do document an overall positive market reaction to the UTB. By allowing the coefficient on UTBMV to vary across ETRMV and OTHMV, we learn that for large firms, the positive association between returns and UTBMV is concentrated in the portion of the UTB that does not affect earnings (OTHMV).
We conjecture a reasonable explanation for this finding. As we describe at the beginning of the ''UTB Components'' section, OTHMV can be a signal of the extent to which the firm engages in state and foreign tax planning because a large portion of OTHMV may just be the difference between the gross and net UTB. 31 To the extent that firms engage in multi-jurisdictional tax planning, the proprietary cost of a FIN 48 disclosure is lower regardless of disclosure quality. The reason is that each taxing authority in each taxing jurisdiction in which the firm engages in tax planning, learns very little from the UTB disclosure as it relates to their jurisdiction. Thus, investors may revise upward their assessment of firms' future cash flows when they observe an ''unexpectedly'' high OTHMV, consistent with investors valuing state and foreign tax planning, and recognizing that the disclosure of OTHMV is less likely to be informative to any one taxing authority. Additionally, OTHMV may not represent a future cash outflow at all if the firm realizes the offsetting deferred tax asset. For these reasons, investors in large firms are likely to have reacted positively when they observed, at adoption, a higher portion of the UTB in the form of OTHMV.
As an aside, we also re-examine H1 and H2 in subsamples of small and large firms by estimating Equation (1) separately for small and large firms (untabulated). We continue to find a negative and significant association between TAXAVD and disclosure quality in both subsamples. However, the negative association is significantly stronger in S&P 600 firms relative to S&P 500 firms, regardless of whether we define the dependent variable as COMPLETE, CLARITY, TOTAL, or D_FWD. These similar results corroborate our subsample 31 Based on discussions with practitioners, this is likely to be a large component of OTHMV. In practice, tax positions that create temporary differences are likely to result in small reserves, and some firms do not set up reserves for many of these tax positions at all, despite the guidance in FIN 48. market reaction tests above, which suggest smaller firms face higher proprietary costs when making FIN 48 disclosures.
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CONCLUSION
We undertake a detailed analysis of firms' UTB disclosure practices under the recently issued mandatory disclosure requirements of FIN 48, which requires disclosure regarding uncertain tax positions. Disclosure theories predict a negative association between proprietary costs and full disclosure because, in equilibrium, managers anticipate that investors will react less negatively to withheld information in the presence of proprietary costs. We apply this theory to the FIN 48 adoption setting because many constituents anticipated that the proprietary costs of the FIN 48 disclosures could be non-trivial. We conduct two sets of tests. First, we examine whether firms that face higher proprietary costs exhibit lower-quality FIN 48 adoption disclosures. Second, we examine how firms' disclosure quality influences investor reaction to initial FIN 48 disclosures of UTB amounts.
We note two key empirical findings, their implication, as well as primary contribution to the literature. First, we find a negative association between measures of proprietary costs and full disclosure (i.e., we observe a lower level of compliance with FIN 48 and less disclosure specificity for firms that engage in more extensive tax avoidance). This finding implies that enforcement issues are salient when implementing mandatory disclosure guidelines for proprietary information. We extend the relatively narrow body of empirical work on the effects of proprietary costs on disclosure beyond segment reporting, improving the external validity of Verrecchia (1983) .
Second, we find evidence consistent with investors penalizing firms that, on average, make high-quality UTB disclosures. Moreover, our results are concentrated in firms with higher proprietary costs, consistent with Verrecchia (1983) . Our finding complements a relatively small but growing body of evidence that investors place a positive value on tax avoidance (e.g., Frischmann et al. 2008; Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Koester 2011) . However, our focus on disclosure quality implies that investors appear willing to accept less disclosure in order to ''facilitate'' firms' tax avoidance activities. This finding is particularly interesting because the motivation for FIN 48 disclosure requirements was to protect investors by forcing firms to provide investors with transparent and comparable disclosures about firms' tax uncertainties.
Disclosure Guidelines (continued)
Computation of Component Score (continued) FIN 48 }21b: D_ETR ¼ 0 if the amount of the UTB that would affect the effective tax rate (ETR) is not disclosed, 0.5 if the UTB changed during the quarter and only the beginning or ending that would affect the ETR was disclosed (but not both), and 1 otherwise.
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The total amount of unrecognized tax benefits that, if recognized, would affect the effective tax rate.
FIN 48 }21c:
D_INTPEN ¼ 0 if neither interest nor penalty amounts were disclosed, 0.5 if interest or penalty amount was disclosed, 1 if both disclosed.
The total amounts of interest and penalties recognized in the statement of operations and the total amounts of interest and penalties recognized in the statement of financial position. FIN 48 }21d1-21d3:
D_FWD ¼ 0 if no forward-looking statement was made, or 0.33 each for mention of the item, nature, and amount of the expected change.
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For positions for which it is reasonably possible that the total amounts of unrecognized tax benefits will significantly increase or decrease within 12 months of the reporting date: (1) The nature of the uncertainty, (2) The nature of the event that could occur in the next 12 months that would cause the change, (3) An estimate of the range of the reasonably possible change or a statement that an estimate of the range cannot be made. The cumulative effect of applying the provisions of this Interpretation shall be reported as an adjustment to the opening balance of retained earnings for that fiscal year, presented separately.
We compute the components of the clarity score as follows:
Description of Measure Computation of Component Score
Was there a disclosure or discussion of reasons for the portion of the UTB that does not affect the ETR?
D_NONETR ¼ 1 if the firm included a discussion of the portion of the UTB that does affect the ETR, 0 otherwise.
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36 This includes giving a 1 to a firm that had a UTB equal to 0 and, therefore, did not have an ETR amount to disclose. 37 This includes giving a 1 to firms that explicitly disclosed ''immaterial'' as the expected amount in the forwardlooking statement regardless of whether the firm provided a description of the item or event. 38 Firms are only required to disclose information related to major tax jurisdictions. The U.S. is a major tax jurisdiction for our sample. 39 This includes giving a 1 to firms that reported a 0 UTB amount. 40 The clarifying nature of D_NONETR is subtle. If the amount of the UTB that affects the ETR is less than the UTB, it does not mean that the difference is due to tax benefits that create temporary differences between book and tax income. D_NONETR could include uncertain tax benefits that create temporary differences, affect goodwill or other comprehensive income, or reflect the difference between the UTB reported on a gross versus net basis. The benefit of explicitly telling an investor that a reduction in the UTB would affect goodwill is that the investor can distinguish preacquisition UTBs arising from the firm's acquisition of target companies with existing UTBs, from aggressive tax positions taken by the firm itself. However, also consider that this information involves proprietary costs because it provides the IRS with the ability to pinpoint the uncertain tax position.
of a tax position only after determining that the relevant tax authority would more-likely-thannot sustain the position following an audit. For tax positions meeting the more-likely-than-not threshold, the amount recognized in the financial statements is the largest benefit that has a greater than 50 percent likelihood of being realized upon ultimate settlement with the relevant tax authority. At the adoption date, the Company applied FIN 48 to all tax positions for which the statute of limitations remained open. changes to the Company's unrecognized tax benefits for uncertain tax positions. As of the date of adoption, the Company's gross unrecognized tax benefits totaled approximately $650, all of which, if recognized, would impact the effective tax rate. The Company does not anticipate there will be any material changes in the unrecognized tax benefits within the next 12 months. Our continuing practice is to recognize interest and penalties related to income tax matters in income tax expense. As of January 1, 2007, the Company had accrued approximately $134 for the payment of interest, which is included as a component of the $650 unrecognized tax benefit noted above. The Company files consolidated and separate income tax returns in the United States federal jurisdiction, many state jurisdictions, and Puerto Rico. With few exceptions, the Company is no longer subject to U.S. federal income tax examinations for years before 2003 and is no longer subject to state and local or Puerto Rico income tax examinations by tax authorities for years before 2002.
